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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE
DISCONNECTION OF CERTAIN
TERRITORY FROM HIGHLAND
TOWN.

Case No.
18191

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appellant herewith files its Reply Brief pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 75 (p)

(1) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

REPLY TO RESPONDENTS' STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents at page 2 of their brief, characterize that
portion of Highland City containing respondents' "rectangle"
as "a peninsula extending east of the main portion of the
city."

This is a conclusion not warranted by the facts.

Highland has no commercial district or any other location
commonly known as "the main portion" of the city.

The area

sought to be disconnected is as vital to the interests of
Highland as any other.

Indeed, because of its recreational

potential, Respondents' property could well be referred to
as the "main portion of the city."

Respondents' character-

ization, therefore, tends to minimize the importance of the
territory under consideration.

-

1 -
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Respondents, at page 4 of their brief, say "there is
no evidence that the zoning of the property in question
would be changed if returned to the jurisdiction of Utah
County.

11

On the other hand,

though, there is abundant

evidence that Respondents have always intended to use the
territory
249).

for the purpose of extracting gravel (T. 130,

Respondents have never at any time denied this in-

tention.

Indeed, they went so far in October, 1978, as to

file a separate lawsuit against both Highland City and Utah
County for the purpose of having Highland City's zoning of
the territory in question and Utah County's zoning of adjacent property declared invalid, as violative of both State
and Federal Constitutions.

That case is entitled Gibbons

Realty Company, a Utah Corporation, Plaintiff, vs. Highland
Town, a Municipal Corporation of the State of Utah, and
Utah County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah,
Defendants; and was filed in the Fourth Judicial District
Court of Utah County under Civil No. 50233.
These steps taken by Respondents certainly would not
indicate an unliklihood that the zoning will be changed.
Respondents at page 6 of their brief say, in what purports
to be a statement of fact, but what instead amounts to a
legal conclusion, that

11

••••

the maps introduced in evidence

show that there would be no islands or peninsular masses

- 2 -
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created by the disconnection of the property in question."
Appellant submits that the contrary is true, and that the
map submitted by stipulation with Appellant's brief
shows the creation of an island
"Kjar Property.

clearly

consisting of the so-called

11

Finally, Respondents at page 6 of their brief state as a
fact that "the property is not needed for the future growth
of Highland City."

This is clearly erroneous.

Testimony is

abundant that the territory is very much needed, for one reason
or another, to foster and accommodate the futµre growth of
Highland City.

This is particularly clear in the testimony

of Mayor Donald R. LeBaron (T. 76, 77, 78, 182, 183, 228).
REPLY TO POINT I OF RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
In a somewhat cavalier manner Respondents attempt to
dismiss out of hand the very considerable s!gnificance of
the language in Sections 10-2-501 (3) and 10-2-503, Utah Code
Annotated (1953), as amended, authorizing any interested
persons to testify against the granting of a disconnection
petition, and providing for consideration by the Court of
the "other factors" set forth in their testimony ..
Respondents characterize these important substantive
provisions as "isolated wording," as though to suggest that
the Legislature simply didn't know what it was doing when it
wrote the language.
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Indeed, disconnection hearings cannot be limited forever
to the consideration of just the stereotypical, stringently
limi~ed

areas relied on in an earlier era.

If the Legislature

deems it worthwhile that the Courts consider new and different
"other factors",

so be it.

In Heathman vs. Giles 13 Utah 2d 368, 374 P.2d 839,
quoted at

p~ge

(1962),

9 of their brief, Respondents themselves, quote

language tending to limit the rule of "nosci tur a sociis"
to "doubtful words or phrases."

Appellant submits that the

rule does not apply here for the reason that "among other
factors" is not a doubtful phrase at all.
As stated in Appellant's Brief at page 14, the controlling
word,

"other

11

,

does not. have a doubtful meaning.

means "different.

11

It always

It never means "similar to" or the "same".

Appellant•s quotation from 67 Corpus Juris Secundum at page
908 makes that abundantly clear.

If "other factors", means

"different factors", then Respondents' attempt to use
"noscitur a sociis" is irrelevant and in no way helpful to
Respondents' position.
For the same reason the rule of "ejusdem generis" referred
to in Respondents' brief at page 10 does not apply either.
Even if "ejusdem generis 11 were otherwise appropriate ..
it would not be of any help to Respondents here because it
applies only where general words follow, rather than precede,

-
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the specific ones.

Appellant pointed this out in its brief

at page 15 in quoting from Lyman vs. Bowmar, Colo. 533 P2d
1129 (1975).
In an effort to get around the logic of that holding
Respondents cite Application of Central Airlines, Okla.,
185 P2d 919 (1947).

There the Court was concerned with the

words "shall include", a phrase that is far more restrictive
than "among other factors", the distinction of course, being
the use of the word "other".
11

similar" or the

11

same 11 ,

"Shall include" can mean

but "other" cannot.

has to mean "different from".

Indeed, "other"

Therefore, the cited case is

of no help whatsoever to Respondents' position.
At page 12 of their brief Respondents arrive at the
illogical conclusion that it is fine for the Court to hear
all the evidence that any interested party desires to talk
about, but wrong for the Court to pay much attention to it.
They talk about "mistaken ideas" and "unsubstantiated fears."
On the contrary, the Court should have declared all of the
evidence presented to be relevant, then decided whether to
allow disconnection on the basis of its

weight

and quality.

Appellant's evidence referred to in paragraphs 1 through
11 on pages 13 through 16 of Respondents' brief is all relevant to the ultimate question, and the Court not only should
have heard it, but also carefully weighed it along with the

-
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other matters that it did deem to be relevant.
Some particular objections of Respondents
without merit and require comment.

are wholly

In paragraph 2 they refer

to some supposedly improper action-- 11 manipulation", to use
their word--on the part of Appellant in entering into a long
term lease, with option to buy, of some property owned by
Respondent Utah Power and Light Co.

As Respondents well

know, this property is intended to serve as a City Park
(T. 182) and it was right and proper that Appellant should
seek to tie it up.

Appellant certainly cannot be criticized

for that action, or for the fact that it would, in fact,
create an island and constitute another valid reason why the
territory should not be disconnected.
In paragraph 5, Respondents make quite a point of the idea
that Respondent J. Keith Hayes' overture toward being released
from the lawsuit was due to some pressure brought by the City.
No impropriety was alleged at the trial, and it doesn•t
really matter why Hayes wanted to pull out.

This merely

adds to the weight of the evidence that the Court should have
considered.
In paragraph 7, Respondents attempt to obscure the obvious
fact that if Gibbons and Reed has its way a tremendous increase in the volume of truck traffic will appear on the
streets of Highland City with all its attendent evils.

-
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Authority for this fact is Emery Carter, Executive Vice
President of Gibbons and Reed who said "you would probably
have about one truck every twelve minutes if you are working about 40 weeks a year, eight hours a day, five days a
week."

(T. 249).

So Mrs. Mathis' concerns were certainly

justified.
The Court should have followed the intent of the two
controlling statutes.

Not only should it have heard all

the testimony offered by Appellant's witnesses, but should
have deemed it all relevant and then proceeded to give it
the same consideration and to weigh

it as carefully as it

did the evidence adduced by Respondents.
It was pointless and wasteful of the time of the Court,
counsel, and witnesses to hear the evidence but refuse to
pay any attention to it.

This certainly wasn't contemplated

by the statutes.
REPLY TO POINT II OF RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
Although they cite several Utah cases, Respondents are
unable to come up with any definition of the words "justice
and equity."

All that they are able to do is give illustra-

tions of some findings made in those cases in which disconnection was allowed.

In fact, Respondents are quite candid in

admitting that Utah statutes do not define the phrase at
all.
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There is nothing in the quotations from the cases that
would indicate that counsel for the cities involved in them
-even made an effort, as Appellant did, to present any evidence
of ''such other factors."

Indeed, it may very well be that

this is the first Utah disconnection case in which this sort
of evidence has been relied on to any extent whatsoever.
If that is so, the Court has not had an adequate opportunity
in the reported cases to welgh

such new and different evidence

against the old categories in attempting to decide whether
the standard of "justice and equity" has been met.
For example, the evidence presented by Dr. LaMond Tullis
about the surveys taken among Highland's residents showing a
strong aversion to the type of gravel extraction envisioned
by Gibbons and Reed (T. 149) makes it difficult to conclude
that a mere handful of landowners are entitled, as a matter
of "justice and equity" to disconnection from Highland City
over the strenuous disapproval of the vast majority of Highland's residents.
Respondents sidestepped Appellants issue as to the meaning
of the word "require" in the context of the phrase
and equity require."

11

justice

The cases cited by Appellant at page

17 of its brief, to which Respondents made no response at
all, clearly show that the word "require
mean "allow" or "permit.'

1

1

'

does not merely

"Require" means "irnperitive need",
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"compel", or "mandatory", and none of these conditions have
been shown to exist in this case.
The issue of whether the Court was obligated to give the
same consideration to Appellant's evidence as it did to
Respondents'

(Point I) is intertwined with the issue of whether

"justice and equity" "require" the disconnection (Point II).
If this Court finds that the trial Court erred in not deeming
Appellant's evidence to be

11

relevant", it must certainly

conclude that Appellant's evidence is strong enough to sustain
a finding that "justice and equity require" a finding against
disconnection, rather than for it.
REPLY TO POINT III OF RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
The map filed by stipulation along with Appellant's brief
clearly shows the fact that the "Kjar property" is nothing
but an island--out there entirely by itself--with no connection
whatsoever with the rest of the City of Highland--unless, of
course, the Order of Disconnection should be reversed.
Respondents would leave the City in a shambles--consisting,
geographically, of two entirely separate territories trying
to function as a single city--an-almost impossible task.
Evidence of this fact, unfortunately, could not have been
introduced at the trial--simply because it didn't exist at
the time.

- 9 -
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However, the information was conveyed to the Court and
counsel soon after the annexation came into being.

Appellant's

attorney wrote a letter to the Court on September 16, 1981,
(R. 144) fully setting forth_ the facts.

At that time, no

Findings or Conclusions had been prepared, and no Order of
Disconnection had been signed.

So the Court had considerable

time in which to consider the new facts.

It would have been

a simple thing to schedule a further hearing, or in lieu
thereof, to modify the Findings and Conclusions and to
reverse the Order.
Substantial justice could have been provided in this manner,
but it was not.

What we have, instead, is a situation that

flies directly in the face of the statute (10-2-503), the
intent of which is to prohibit disconnection of territory
where it results in the creation of such islands as the Kjar
property.
Respondents make much of the point raised in Campbell vs.
American Foreign SS Corp., 116 F 2d 926 (2d cir. 1941), quoted
in Respondents' brief at page 25, about newly discovered
evidence having to be in existence at the time of the trial.
That case would not seem to apply here because, as previously
pointed out, this case had not come to an end.

Indeed, no

decision had been made, there was no jury involved, and only
the slightest inconvenience would have occurred in scheduling
another few minutes of testimony and argument.

- 10 -
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little thing to do in order to prevent such an unfortunate
result.
The other case particularly relied on by Respondents,
Patrick vs. Sedwick,Alaska 413 P2d 169 (1976) is not really
in point.

In fact, all the general grounds for the granting

of a new trial set forth in that case, and paraphrased on
page 25 of Respondents' brief are met here.
There is no merit, either, in Respondents' argument that
Appellant "managed" the evidence in the case, and presumably
therefore, should be denied the relief it seeks.

The leasing

of the Utah Power and Light property, and the annexation of
the Kjar property were proper in every respect and certainly
in the public interest.
The Court had an obligation to take the simple and timely
actions necessary to guarantee a proper resolution of this
case.

All it had to do was take a little more evidence and

hear a little, more argument.

This it failed and refused to

do, and# thus, deprived Appellant of substantive rights to
which it was entitled.

This amounted to an abuse of the

Court's discretion.
CONCLUSION
Respondents' able counsel has argued his points well,
but has been unable to show that Appellant was not entitled
to have the testimony of its witnesses heard and considered.
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by the trial Court in the same manner as Respondents' own
witnesses; that "justice and equity require" the disconnection
of the territory; or that the denial of Appellant's motion
for a new trial or to amend Findings, Conclusions, and Order
should have been denied by the Court.
Instead, the Order of the Court should be reversed and
the case remanded for the reasons set forth here and in
Appellant's original brief.
Respectfully submitted,

VERNON B. ROMNEY
404 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Appellant
Highland Town, aka
Highland City, a Municipal
Corporation

CERTIFICATE
I certify that ·r personally delivered two copies of the
foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant to the office of BRYCE E.
ROE, Attorney for Respondents, 340 East 4th South Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and that I mailed two copies to
JOHN C. BACKLUND, Attorney for Intervenors, 350 East Center
Street, Provo, Utah 84601, this _ _ _ day of July, 1982.

- 12 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

